



Committee on Port Governance and Management

12 October 2023 – European Port House, Brussels
Danique de Jonge



AGENDA



- 1. European Port Strategy: latest state of play**
- 2. Foreign Direct Investment Regulation: upcoming revision**
- 3. Foreign Subsidies Regulation: implementation**
- 4. Consortia Block Exemption Regulation**
- 5. Port Masterplan: first results ESPO survey**
- 6. Innovation Fund**
- 7. ESPO Port Investment Study: draft survey questions**
- 8. Upcoming EU elections: ESPO preparations**

Parallel initiatives in EP to protect EU critical infrastructure




Parallel initiatives in the European Parliament calling for a strengthened approach to protect EU critical infrastructure:

1) Comprehensive European Port Strategy

- Transport Committee (TRAN): in charge
- International Trade Committee (INTA): opinion to TRAN

2) AFET/SEDE report: Security and defence implications of China's influence on critical infrastructure in the EU

EU Port Strategy: foreseen timeline in TRAN



**Deadline of amendments:
TODAY / 12 October**

EU Port Strategy: main players in TRAN



Transport Committee (TRAN):

- in charge of the report

Rapporteur: Tom Berendsen (EPP, NL)

Shadows:

- Kathleen van Brempt (S&D, BE)
- Bergur L. Rasmussen (Renew, DK)
- Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, BE)
- Jutta Paulus (Greens, DE)
- Marco Campomenosi (ID, IT)
- João Pimenta Lopez (The Left, PT)

Berendsen draft report: assessment



➤ See [C-4093](#) for complete overview

General assessment secretariat:

- Report based on four pillars: 1) foreign influence, 2) security risks, 3) role of ports in the energy transition, 4) competitiveness of Europe's ports.
- Signals problems and risks.
- Asks a solution for those, but no too concrete legislative proposals in the draft report.
- There is room for strengthening the competitiveness pillar, ports as energy hubs.
- ESPO to try to take out certain inaccuracies.

Main points draft report:

- EU ports gateways to the world.
- Vital role of ports in the energy transition (energy hubs).
- Need to strengthen the economic position of EU ports and improving their competitiveness.
- Recognise that ports are driven by demand from importers and exporters.
- The importance of the EU global gateway initiative.

Berendsen draft report: main points



... main points continued:

- Existing instruments (FDI regulation and FSR) are not enough.
- Rapporteur calls for an EU Strategic policy framework **to REDUCE and LIMIT influence and operational control** by non-EU countries in EU ports, their processes and hinterland connections.
- Need for a continuous monitoring and reporting of the influence of non-EU countries.
- An assessment of the impact of **vertical integration** in maritime logistics (CBER).
- Analysing and assessing the investment needs in ports (role in energy).
- Measures for cooperation to combat drug trafficking.
- Possibility of **introducing an EU maritime cabotage** law to apply to non-EU shippers (referring to China's restrictive law on cabotage for European shipping companies).
- Suggests that all **Member States introduce laws “to retake control” of ports**, terminals and maritime infra (contingency plans for a major conflict scenario).

ESPO amendments to Berendsen draft report (I)



- **On 2 October, the secretariat held a combined PGM and ExCo online meeting to discuss the rapporteur's draft report and define ESPO amendments;**
- **ESPO amendments shared with selected shadow rapporteurs and other MEPs, in view of the deadline of amendments (12 October).**

Main outcome:

- Expand on the crucial and **comprehensive role of ports**:
 - Not only as logistics and transport hubs and gateways to trade], but also as **energy hubs, clusters of industry and blue economy, facilitators of military mobility**;
 - Ports are **crucial partners in Europe's energy transition** by enabling the production, supply and import of clean and crucial energy sources, including **hydrogen**, as well as by **facilitating the supply chain for realising the Net-Zero Industry Plan**;
 - Vital role of ports in COVID pandemic and Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, a.o. by **ensuring continuance of supply chains**, setting up alternative routes, establishing at short term alternative routes for the **provision of LNG** and increasing Europe's gas storage.
 - Underlines that European ports are pivotal in **safeguarding Europe's energy security** and in reducing its external energy dependency; Europe's ports have and will be instrumental in repowering Europe in the short term as well as in reinforcing the efforts to prepare for a fossil-free energy landscape in Europe;
- Call for **treating ports equally as other EU critical infrastructures** in addressing foreign influence;
- Do not only focus on Chinese investments, but take **an equal and country-neutral approach** for all **non-EU state-owned companies**.

ESPO amendments to Berendsen draft report (II)



- Stress the usage / implementation of existing instruments:
 - Port instruments: **port concessions and/or lease contracts as important tools** for port managing bodies to safeguard the control and intervene in cases of breaches of contracts.
 - Recently adopted EU instruments (FDI, FSR) to address foreign investments in critical infrastructure.
 - FDI screening: in upcoming review, important to make a FDI screening system **mandatory in all Member States**, to ensure a level playing field across Europe; an assessment on the basis of this Regulation should take place within a **reasonable timeframe and respect confidentiality** during the screening process, to **ensure legal certainty** for potential investors.
 - Foreign Subsidies Regulation: is only applicable as of July 2023, and as such it is **too early to assess its functioning**; importance of monitoring its implementation in due time to assess its full impact;
- Underline that the competitiveness of EU ports is crucial for **Europe's supply chain sovereignty** and that **European legislation that risks to undermine the competitiveness of EU ports and creates carbon and business leakage to ports outside the EU (EU ETS!) should be avoided**;
- Emphasize that **in the last 20 years Europe has seen an increase of trade flows from non-European countries** and as such ports cannot be seen as stand-alone assets and are part of supply chains driven by demand from European importers and exporters;
- Underline that ports have large investment needs, including to facilitate the energy transition, and that these investments **are of high societal value but often lack the required return on investment for the investing port**;
- Expand that the energy transition in ports will not be possible without a skilled workforce, but also **easy and swift permitting procedures, adequate public and private funding, as well as EU legislation adequately recognising and facilitating the energy role of ports, including in the TEN-T Regulation**;
- When it comes to the use of non-EU state-controlled platforms in ports, underline that these **may pose** (instead of pose) economic and strategic risks for the EU;
- Clarify that ports are affected by the illicit drugs that are increasingly infiltrating Europe's society and underline the need for measures ensuring effective European cooperation **between all relevant authorities and players**.

ESPO amendments to Berendsen draft report (III)



Selection of concrete text proposals:

- Par 2. Calls on the Commission to present an EU strategic policy framework to **keep** ~~reduce and limit~~ **the** influence and operational control by non-EU countries in the EU's ports and in their processes and hinterland operations **limited to a strict level avoiding effective participation or control (direct or indirect) in the management of a port authority**;
- Par 7. Calls on the Commission to research and assess the impact of vertical integration in maritime logistics, the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation, ~~and~~ the formation of container alliances **and the advantageous fiscal climate on the competitiveness of Europe's ports**; **calls on the Commission to look particularly at the impact of these developments on non-EU country influence in EU ports**; **calls on the Commission to intervene when necessary, in order to ensure a fair power balance and level playing field between all actors in the port ecosystem and to safeguard a healthy, competitive and diversified maritime and logistics environment for Europe's ports**;
- Par 16. Stresses the vital role ports play in the energy transition as energy hubs for the conversion, conditioning and storing of energy carriers, for the import of **hydrogen and other crucial energy sources as well as of critical raw materials, as essential hubs in the development of EU Net-Zero industry ecosystems**, as servicing stations for offshore energy facilities and as nodes in transport systems supporting the energy transition;
- Par 23. Underlines the importance of the **a solid and well-thought-out** EU Global Gateway initiative as **a tool to build strategic, sustainable and secure transport corridors and support global value chains**; **hence the initiative may enhance the connectivities and competitiveness of Europe's ports when investments are chosen strategically and safeguard the level playing, and can be** a strategic global alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative; **highlights in this regard the importance for the EU to step up its economic diplomacy**;
- Par 20. Calls on the Commission to analyse and address the investment needs of **Europe's** ports in order for them to be competitive in the future and to work towards a more stable investment climate **that is attractive to foreign investors and ensures legal certainty for potential investors and stakeholders and that** includes ~~ing~~ transparency **on conclusions of** and predictability in investment assessments;

EU Port Strategy: debate on Berendsen draft report, 9 October



- On 9 October, rapporteur Berendsen presented his draft report in the Transport Committee.
- The shadow rapporteurs and MEPs from other political groups reacted to the draft report and highlighted their respective priorities.
 - S&D shadow Van Brempt: FDI good starting point but not good enough; focus on a just transition, dockers and seafarers, the right to good working conditions;
 - Renew shadow Rasmussen: EU not be too protectionist, need for balance, importance of private investment in ports;
 - Green shadow Paulus: lack of references to greening the port or impact of rising sea levels on ports; focus also on port call optimisation, linking port rail network to the cities, more cooperation between ports;
 - ECR shadow Van Overtveldt: access to information should be limited and monitoring given the cyberthreats, need for better awareness on consequences of data misuse;
 - Maltese MEP Cutajar (S&D): importance of ports for connectivity of remote regions; need to take stock of the implementation of the FF55 measures, and warned for the risk of carbon and business leakage which could have important social and economic implications for the EU ports concerned.
- The Commission replied that the investment needs of ports are enormous and added there should be a balance when it comes to foreign investments. Also reference to:
 - Upcoming **report on the TEN-T investment needs** (early 2024), including of TEN-T ports, in light of the preparations of the next MFF and CEF III;
 - Upcoming **Action Plan on drug trafficking and organised crime**, including an initiative on ports;
 - Upcoming revision of FDI instrument + ongoing revision TEN-T and specifically Article 47;
 - “The Commission remains open to discuss further options, but these will in any case be dealt with by the next Commission”

EU Port Strategy: Opinion by INTA



International Trade Committee (INTA)

- writes opinion to TRAN (= NOT binding)

Rapporteur: Iuliu WINKLER (EPP, Romania)

Shadows:

- Margarida Marques (S&D, PT)
- Marie-Pierre Vedrenne (RENEW, FR)
- Jan Zahradil (ECR, CZ)
- Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens, DE)
- Marco Campomenosi (ID, IT)
- Emmanuel Maurel (The Left, FR)

Timeline:

11 July – draft report

26 September – deadline amendments

EU Port Strategy: INTA draft opinion



Main points of Winkler's draft opinion:

- The importance of an **open and assertive EU trade policy** to strengthen the competitiveness and resilience of EU ports;
- The reference to EU ports as “key artery for EU and global trade”;
- References to **already existing EU legislations** enabling the protection of critical infrastructure, including the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) screening instrument, **and the need for investment and training for port authorities to implement those legislations**;
- Mentioning of **reciprocity** as being at the core of Europe's trade relationship with China;
- Pointing towards the role of the EU's Global Gateway initiative **in strengthening the network of European ports with third countries**;

Referring to critical infrastructure and potential risks, the draft report emphasises that:

- **In certain cases**, foreign trade and investment can cause security vulnerabilities, in particular with regard to **foreign ownership, control or access to EU critical infrastructure, including ports**;

Specifically referring to Chinese investments in EU ports, the draft report underlines that:

- **Chinese state companies have sought to acquire majority or controlling stakes in a number of European ports** as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is a strategy aiming to gain influence over key European naval infrastructure;
- The report refers to the Belt and Road Initiative as a **distinct matter of economic security** of considerable importance in the current context of geopolitical competition;

➤ **More details:** [C-4049](#)

INTA amendments (I)



In total, 80 amendments tabled (in FRENCH), of which **41(!)** are in line with / reflect ESPO views and/or cover exact wording of ESPO suggested amendments - including:

- Increasingly important **role of ports as energy hubs**, incl. in the supply, production, supply and storage of energy; and as **industrial clusters**; (AMs 1 Marques, 2 Hübner, 8 Campomenosi, 35 Lange; 8 Campomenosi); Crucial role of ports in COVID-pandemic, Russia's war against Ukraine, energy crisis; in ensuring the continuity of supply chains, setting up alternative routes, reducing energy dependence; (incl. AMs 9 Marques, 10 Hübner, 13 Winkler)
 - Lange (AM 35): to achieve Union hydrogen objectives, Port Strategy should include a comprehensive strategy on [hydrogen] imports, coordination and infrastructure development;
- **Not single out ports** when it comes to addressing security/resilience, but equal treatment with other modes; (AM 5 Winkler)
- Underline the need for **global level playing field** of EU ports **to ensure their competitiveness**; unfair competition from **non-EU ports, which are exempted from the EU ETS**; avoid legislative measures that lead to **business leakage from EU ports to ports outside EU**; (AMs 19 Warborn, 20 Hübner, 27 Canas, 32 Winkler, 73 Hübner, 74 Warborn)
- Need for measures to address **vertical integration/ growing market power of shipping companies**; importance of timely dialogue and avoid stranded assets; (AMs 52 Lange, 71 Marques, 78 Hübner)
- Underline that **ports are driven by demand from exporters and importers**; (AM 5 Winkler)
- Recognition that ports do **large investments to comply** with obligations from FF55 and to play their comprehensive role, incl in energy transition, and as such this also highlights the need for **sufficient support** for ports/port authorities; (AMs 29 Marques, 31 Hübner, 36 Kumpula-Natri, 37 Maurel, 75 Campomenosi)
- Need for **strengthening FDI screening instrument** during upcoming revision, making it **mandatory in all MS** to ensure level playing field; need for **legal certainty, predictability and confidentiality** during the screening process; (AM57 Winkler (partly), 58 Hübner, 59 Warborn, 60 Marques)
 - Marques (AM 60): make the FDI Regulation more binding
- Foreign investments in essential and critical infrastructure that **enable effective participation or control (direct or indirect) in the management** of the port should be avoided; (AMs 39 Marques, 40 Hübner)
- Need for **reciprocity** and rules-based trade relationships; (AM 45 Vedrenne, 46 Bütikofer, 76 Bütikofer)
- Incl in the context of Europe's Global Gateway initiative, emphasize the need to step **up Europe's economic diplomacy**; (AM66 Winkler, 67 Marques, 68 Hübner);

INTA amendments (II)



Other amendments:

- Use Global Gateway initiative to also strengthen partner countries and their strategic infrastructures **to prevent them from falling under the control of foreign investors pursuing ambiguous objectives**; (AM 64 Vedrenne)
- Calls for **strengthened customs union** (e.g. common customs code, harmonised customs controls in all EU ports, strengthened border control authorities, identical custom standards) in order to combat crime and avoid unfair competition between EU ports, incl references to trafficking and mafias that have flourished in EU ports; (AM44 Maurel, 38 Kumpula-Natri, 53 Marques, 56 Marques, 79 Canas, 80 Canas)
- Reference to concerns about the “growing risk of money laundering, tax fraud and tax evasion in Europe associated with ‘**free ports**’”; (AM 63 Maurel)
- **Increased cooperation between EU ports should be obligatory** and harmful competition - e.g. regarding underpricing - must be avoided; (AM 25 Lange) Need for national port authorities, Member States and COM to develop an **adequate format for strategic cooperation between EU ports** in order to minimize the risks of being “played out against each other” by third parties; (AM47 Bütikofer)
- Specific attention **to ports in Member States bordering Russia** which are facing new types of logistical challenges; (AM14 Kumpula-Natri) and to strategic importance and economic potential of **the Arctic** and its maritime industry; (AM 54 Kumpula-Natri) Need to **refuse access to EU ports** to ships whose last or next port of call is in the **Russian Federation** (excl. justified humanitarian reasons); (AM 55 Warborn)
- **Strengthen role of EU ports in facilitating the transit of grain from Ukraine**; (AM65 Gvori) and importance of considering Ukrainian ports and terminals as integral part of the European port and trade system and recognise their financial difficulties; (AM 72 Lange)

INTA amendments (III)



- Call for **more EU coordination regarding facilitation of information sharing** and security guidelines for national and private operators; (AM 41 Winkler)
- **EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation** essential to preserve and promote the **European maritime industrial base** and safeguard maritime strategic autonomy; (AM 17 Vedrenne)
- Call for **coordinated preliminary action for the use of OPS** in ports from 2030; (AM 30 Lange)
- Reference to the trend of **regionalization of trade** which complicates the mission of EU ports and induces ports to take on new competitive tasks and tighten intraregional connection; (AM 3 Campomenosi)
- Reference to the **ban on cabotage for European ships** between Chinese ports and between American ports, and the lack of such restrictions vice versa; (AM 48 Maurel)
- Call for a “**transitional nationalisation of infrastructures**” critical to our commercial sovereignty, including ports, when they are subject to majority takeover attempts by non-EU countries or companies; (AM 49 Maurel)
- A call for an **increase in the share of containerized freight to and from Europe**, which will make it possible to regain European flows and increase the number of European jobs; (AM 28 Maurel)
- Need to boost investment in the adoption of innovative solutions and **digital transition** in the port sector; (AM 29 Marques)

AFET-report on Chinese influence on critical infrastructure



Own-initiative report in Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET):

“The security and defence implications of China influence on critical infrastructure in the European Union”

Rapporteur: Klemen Groselj (RENEW, Slovenia)

Shadows:

- Miriam Lexmann (EPP, SK)
- Juozas Olekas (S&D, LT)
- Markéta Gregorova (GREENS, CZ)
- Jaak Madison (ID, EE)
- Assita Kanko (ECR, BE)
- Clare Daly (LEFT, IE)

Timeline

5 September - draft report

6 October – deadline for amendments

27 November – intended committee vote?

AFET-draft report: main points (I)



Groselj's draft report identifies **China's military-civil fusion (MCF) strategy** as the "core of the problem":

- China's military-civil fusion strategy is a state-led, state-directed programme and plan to instrumentalise all levers of state and commercial power to **strengthen and support the People's Liberation Army (PLA)**, the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP);
- China's party-driven political system and economy often **require private companies to align their commercial interests with the CCP's military, repression and political interference** activities; consequentially, Chinese companies' international activities help the CCP to expand its influence over foreign countries and undermine geopolitical rivals;
- Concern that European critical infrastructure is becoming increasingly vulnerable to external influence;

→ Mirrors concerns underlined by academics and research institutes (e.g. Jonathan Holslag – ["Every Ship a Warship"](#))

Criticizes existing EU legislative actions (FDI, FSR) as not sufficient and wants stronger instruments:

- Initiatives are **largely limited to screening procedures for foreign direct investment**, leaving other channels open for the CCP to gain access and influence over critical assets;
- Therefore calls for the current instruments to be expanded **to include generalised screening procedures for all stakeholders involved in EU critical infrastructure projects**;
- Calls on the Commission, with support of the Member States, **to map, track and assess China's access to critical infrastructure in the EU.**

AFET-draft report: main points (II)



Specifically **warns** for the risks of China's access to ports
(→ *Yet no specific demands for the Commission to take action*)

- China's naval forces having legal tools to ensure that **China's civilian ships and infrastructure can be used for military and security purposes**;
- China can **use its civilian commercial infrastructure to support the PLA's (China's army) presence in third countries**;
- Warns that such MCF (China's military-civilian fusion) **provides the PLA with access to foreign ports**, enabling it to pre-position logistics support to sustain naval deployments as far afield as the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean;
- Underlines that the **risks of espionage** are highest when Chinese civilian commercial assets are located **in logistics hubs close to EU and NATO naval bases or port operators** that have signed agreements to provide logistical support to European companies;
- Concerned about China's strategy to build a **'blue economy cooperation base' along the coast of Africa**, including through the construction of fishing vessels and vessel repairs facilities, which can also be used for military purposes;

Next steps & to discuss



- Negotiations between political groups in coming weeks in TRAN and INTA (Port Strategy) and AFET (critical infrastructure)
- Political aims to finalise and vote the reports as quickly as possible, before EU elections (June 2024)

TRAN: deadline for amendments **TODAY**

➤ **Secretariat to analyse (upcoming) amendments, report to PGM (&ExCo) members & continue talks with rapporteur/shadows!**

To discuss:

ESPO priorities in ongoing talks?

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Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regulation: recap



Recap

- The **Foreign Direct Investment Regulation** (EU 2019/452) sets a framework for the Commission and the Member States to **cooperate** in the screening of foreign direct investment in selected sectors, including the transport sector.
 - In force since October 2020.
 - **‘foreign direct investment’ (FDI)** means an investment of any kind by a foreign investor aiming to establish or to maintain lasting and direct links between the foreign investor and the entrepreneur to whom or the undertaking to which the capital is made available in order to carry on an economic activity in a Member State, including investments which enable effective participation in the management or control of a company carrying out an economic activity;
 - **Member States are not obliged to install a screening mechanism + can choose to some extent the scope of application!**
- In case the Commission considers that a FDI is likely to affect projects or programmes of Union interest on ground of security or public order, the Commission **may** issue an opinion - during planning phase of project or when completed.
 - The opinion is sent to the “other Member states”
 - The Member state where the FDI is planned or completed *“shall take utmost account of the Commission’s opinion and provide an explanation to the Commission if its opinion is not followed”*
- DG TRADE revealed that the Commission issues a (non-binding) opinion in only 3% of the cases – **ports are not in the Top 5 of investigated cases.**

FDI Regulation: evaluation & consultation (I)



The Commission (DG TRADE) has been evaluating the Regulation, especially in light of “the growing concern about certain FDIs and some investments by investors established in the EU but ultimately owned or controlled by non-EU persons”

- **Evaluation report is due TODAY / 12 October 2023;**
- As part of this evaluation exercise, the Commission held a **public consultation** in July 2023 to collect feedback on the implementation of the FDI instrument from stakeholders;
- Commission already identified **shortcomings** of existing Regulation (next slide).

FDI Regulation: evaluation & consultation (II)



Shortcomings of existing Regulation identified by Commission:

- **The definition of investments covered** by the current EU framework is limited to investments by legal or natural persons from non-EU countries. Investments by EU companies ultimately owned or controlled by non-EU persons are not included, except for situations involving artificial arrangements that do not reflect economic reality and circumvent screening mechanisms.
- **Screening mechanisms do not cover the whole of the EU.** Member States can decide not to control FDIs coming into their country. This could create an entry point to the whole single market for investments that might pose risks to security or public order.
- **The sectorial coverage of screening mechanisms is uneven.** The difference between Member States' screening mechanisms is a possible loophole for entry to the single market.
- **Coverage of transactions is uneven.** Member States are free to determine which transactions fall under the scope of their screening mechanisms.
- **The reporting to other Member States and the Commission on the substantial outcome of the screening procedure for investments is fragmented and uneven.** The Member State hosting the FDI may be seen to be lacking accountability, and the screening authorities of other Member States or the Commission have no visibility on whether their concerns on specific FDIs have been taken into account.
- **There is little homogeneity in the procedural aspects of national investments screening systems.** This includes heterogeneous investigation and approval deadlines, which is particularly acute when the same transaction is notified to different Member States.
- **The scope of information to be provided to the Commission and all Member States for a comprehensive and efficient risk assessment is described in too general terms.**

FDI Regulation: ESPO messages for upcoming revision



ESPO participated in the Commission's public consultation (call for evidence) in July.

To recall - main points:

- Importance of **safeguarding Europe's open investment environment**;
- The port sector is **highly capital intensive**; only with sufficient investments – be it European or non-European – will European ports be able to retain their competitive position, implement the Green Deal ambitions and enhance Europe's resilience;
- Make an FDI mechanism **mandatory in all Member States** and certain aspects – in particular the scope and definitions – could be further harmonised in view of having a level playing field;
- **Avoid an isolated regime for ports** - a revised EU framework for screening FDIs should ensure that Europe's critical infrastructures are treated equally and are subject to the same set of rules;
- **Legal certainty, confidentiality and clear and consistent timeframes** are paramount in any screening mechanism, in order to ensure that Europe remains an attractive place to invest in ports and avoid investors go to ports outside Europe!
 - Screening processes should be clear and objective on the basis of concrete and qualitative assessment criteria;
 - Authorities should employ sufficient staff in order to allow for a thorough but swiftly screening procedure;
 - Screening processes when ongoing should take place in a confidential manner.

Next steps & to discuss



Next steps

- Evaluation report due **TODAY / 12 October 2023**
- & Upcoming **proposal for a revision of the FDI instrument.**
- **Secretariat to make an analysis of the proposed measures (once published) & revert back to members to define ESPO messages!**

Exchange of views

Do members have experience with the implementation of the FDI instrument in a port context?

What should be part of ESPO messages (in light of upcoming revision)?

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Foreign Subsidies Regulation: recap



In a nutshell...

- On **12 July 2023**, the Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR) will become applicable (- entry into force 12 January 2023).
- The FSR establishes a new tool to **address distortions in the European internal market caused by foreign subsidies**, with the overall objective of strengthening the **resilience** of the Union.
- The new investigatory tool allows the European Commission to examine foreign subsidies granted to undertakings operating in the internal market. **In case it finds such subsidies to be distortive, the Commission may take appropriate binding redressive measures.**

Scope

- **The FSR covers all sectors and all economic activities.** Yet, the main focus will be on **concentrations** (mergers, acquisitions of control, joint ventures) and **public procurements**.
- The FSR has enshrined a certain **retroactivity**: the Commission may examine any foreign financial contributions granted in the **five years prior** to the date of application of this Regulation (i.e. 12 July 2018 onwards). In the case of concentrations and public procurements, this is limited to **three years** (i.e. 12 July 2020 onwards).
- The FSR not only covers foreign subsidies coming from a third country's **central government and public authorities** at all others levels, but also from **foreign public and private entities whose actions can be attributed to the third country**.

FSR: implementation in ports



- As from 12 October 2023, foreign subsidies received in the context of concentrations and public procurements meeting certain conditions must be prior notified to the Commission.
- In July, the Commission adopted the Implementing Regulation laying down the procedural rules for such notifications and the subsequent assessment of the foreign subsidies, including regarding the types of information to be provided as well as the dedicated forms to be used when submitting the information to the Commission (see [C-4039](#)).

Exchange of views

What is the experience of your port with the FSR are so far?

- *How has your port prepared for complying with this Regulation, in particular with the prior notification obligation?*
- *Are the procedural rules for notifications clear (as established in the Implementing Regulation) clear enough?*
- *Do you foresee that it will be difficult to collect or provide the required data to the Commission?*
- *Does your port foresee any negative consequences of this new instrument for port authorities, including in the case of public procurements or when issuing concessions?*

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CBER: Commission decision 10 October



- On 10 October, the European Commission decided to **not** extend the Consortia Block Exemption Regulation (CBER).
 - To recall, the CBER sets the legal framework that exempts liner shipping consortia from EU antitrust rules;
 - Current CBER is valid until 24 April 2024;
 - CBER has been put in place for nearly 15 years.
- The Commission concludes that **the CBER no longer promotes competition** in the shipping sector and therefore decides to let it **expire on 25 April 2024**.
- Commissioner Didier Reynders (in charge of competition policy):

*“Shipping services are crucial to European and world trade. This key sector has **undergone significant structural changes**, such as carriers’ consolidation, global alliances and **vertical integration**, resulting in new market conditions, which became apparent during the coronavirus pandemic. Our evaluation has shown that a dedicated block exemption for shipping lines is **no longer adapted to those new market conditions**. This is why we have decided not to extend the current framework and to let it expire on 25 April 2024.”*

CBER: updated ESPO position



- Commission carried out an **evaluation** of the CBER, which was **launched in August 2022** and was aimed at gathering evidence on the functioning of the CBER;
- During the latest Executive Committee and Port Governance meetings, members agreed to **review the ESPO position** on the CBER and to take a stronger position on the topic.
- ESPO updated its position and participated in the evaluation process in July (circulated to members) – main points:
 - COM must ensure a **European legislative framework that safeguards and allows for fair competition** and a level playing field in the maritime and logistics sector;
 - Under the current conditions, the intended **benefits of the CBER** – to other stakeholders down the chain and consumers – **have not been fairly shared**;
 - ESPO recognises **the needs of small operators**, for whom a smooth procedure to conclude consortia should remain;
 - In parallel to horizontal integration: a **new development of vertical integration**, fuelled by current market conditions and advantageous fiscal climate for shipping lines, might further undermine a fair power balance and level playing field in the logistics and supply chain.
 - Call upon the Commission to **effectively monitor** horizontal & vertical integration and its impact on the sector, and intervene when required.
 - Ensure that the pressure from shipping lines on the port's infrastructure charges and investment policies is not becoming excessive & importance of shipping lines to consult in good times with the port managing bodies, to **avoid a mismatch between investments** made in the port & the needs of shipping lines and to avoid **stranded assets!**



In its Staff Working Document published on 10 October, the Commission outlines its findings of the recent evaluation of the CBER. Main points:

- The evidence collected from stakeholders point towards the **low or limited effectiveness and efficiency** of the CBER throughout the **2020-2023 (COVID!) period**;
- Given the small number and low profile of consortia falling within the scope of the CBER, the CBER brings **limited compliance cost savings to carriers** and plays a secondary role in carriers' decision to cooperate;
- Over the evaluation period, the CBER was **no longer enabling smaller carriers to cooperate among each other** and offer alternative services in competition with larger carriers;
- **Trend towards vertical integration of carriers (!)**: carriers expanding in upstream (e.g. port or terminal operations), downstream (e.g. freight forwarding services) and/or adjacent markets (e.g. door-to-door services). Such competitive structure would call for a case-by-case assessment of the market power of carriers on the relevant markets.

Implications & next steps



- The upcoming expiry of the CBER (as of 25 April 2024) does **not** mean that cooperation between shipping lines becomes unlawful under EU antitrust rules;
- Instead, it means that carriers operating to or from the EU will have to assess the compatibility of their cooperation agreements with EU antitrust rules.
- The Commission refers to the extensive guidance in the Horizontal Block Exemption Regulation and Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation.
 - **To be assessed & to be further discussed, including with the Commission!**
- 2M decision to terminate the consortium: by January 2025 (- in practice already happening). Formal end earlier, by April 2024?

Exchange of views

- **What impact can we expect this decision to have on ports?**
 - **ESPO next steps??**

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Port Masterplan: ESPO Survey



- In August – September, members were asked to fill out the ESPO survey on port masterplans.
- This follows an earlier decision to carry out an ESPO mapping exercise on port masterplans to generate a better understanding of the various practices when it comes to masterplans or long-term strategic planning in the different ports and Member States.
- The deadline for responding was 25 September.

GENERAL OUTCOME

- In total **20 individual port managing bodies and 1 national port association** responded, from in total **12 countries**: Denmark, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Finland, France, Netherlands, Romania, Belgium, Norway.
- **Good geographical coverage**, with ports from the South, East, North and West of Europe having participated.
- Most ports have some form of masterplan, but different understandings and different elements incorporated.



I. Strategic plan

- **All of the ports** that responded have some form of strategic plan.
 - The strategic plans vary in duration, from **relatively short-term** (2 to 5 years) to more **medium-term** (5-10 years / up to 2030), and sometimes include **both short-term and medium/long-term horizons** (up to 2040).
 - In some cases, the strategic plans are predominantly **business plans**, while others are more comprehensive and include **vision, mission, and values**.
 - Usually the **port authority** develops the strategic plan, sometimes in cooperation with local/regional/national **authorities**, and in some cases with support from **external experts** (e.g. consulting firms) and/or **environmental agencies**.
 - Central themes include 1) **sustainability / ecological transition**, 2) **business development**, 3) **spatial planning**, 4) **finance**, 5) **multimodality**.



II. Masterplan

Most of the ports* – 17 out of 20 – have some kind of masterplan.

(*individual port managing bodies)

- These masterplans come in various names, including *Master Plan*, *Infrastructure Master Plan*, *Action Plan*, or *Port Development Plan*.
- In some ports these are **predominantly infrastructure plans**, while in other ports they involve **strategic plans** (e.g. not yet containing 100% precisely the respective infrastructure projects and sites for it), and in others a combination of **strategic and infrastructure plan**.
In some ports, masterplans are strictly linked to the **greening of the port** (Green Port Master Plan), while others treat masterplans is more to be seen as **a process** (masterplanning: strategic thinking, scenario modelling) rather than a final product (masterplan).
- Sometimes the masterplan is **a document/instrument separate from the port's strategic plan**, while in other cases the masterplan is **part of the overall strategic plan**.
In those latter cases, the masterplan tends to be focused on infrastructure and spatial planning.

ESPO Survey: first results



- In all of the masterplans, **the port authority is in charge or involved** in its development.
 - This can be the port management, the strategic department, port planning department, the infrastructure department, the technical department, the environment department, the commercial department, or a combination thereof.
 - In some ports, we see active involvement of **local or regional/national authorities**: either in **developing** the plan or in the **approval** phase.
 - In some cases, port authorities involve external experts (e.g. consultants).
- The average duration of masterplans vary between **short-term** (2-5 years) [**3 of the respondents**], medium-term (5-10 years) [**6 of the respondents**], to long-term (up to 2050 / 30 years) [**5 of the respondents**].
- Some countries have **clear legal obligations** for ports to have a masterplan (e.g. Italy, Spain (infrastructure master plan in case of new state ports or port expansions), France), while others **do not** (e.g. Finland, Portugal (not yet), Netherlands, Belgium, Romania, Norway, Poland); in other countries it is more **suggestive** (e.g. Germany), while in some countries you have **certain legal obligations** – e.g. to be transparent in management and mitigate risks – which can be fulfilled with a masterplan (e.g. Denmark).



- In all of the cases, **making changes** to the masterplan is possible, yet the nature and frequency of these changes vary.
 - In some ports, changes in the **short-term** (e.g. within 45 days) can be made when they concern **technical-functional (and not substantial) adjustments**, while substantial changes require the approval procedures (which are more lengthy in time) of the original masterplan.
 - In other ports, the masterplans are **'living documents'** and can be changed by the port authority when needed.
 - Some ports have foreseen **dedicated mid-term reviews**, while others do not foresee this and make **revisions when deemed necessary**.
 - Nearly all port masterplans include **agility in cases of major crises**. Some ports include this already in the **initial plan** (potential crisis scenarios), some ports have **separate crisis plans** (e.g. disaster recovery plans), sometimes they are based on **government crisis plans**, while other ports allow for a **complete revision** in case of crisis scenarios. Other ports do not foresee a real revision in case of huge crises and aim to **retain or restore its original status**.

ESPO Survey: first results



- Many ports report that when **comparing former masterplans (if existing) with current ones**, the current masterplans contain more and more **environmental management**. Others highlight more **energy aspects** and **digital transformations**. Some ports report a shift from a more national to incorporating more an **international perspective**. Other ports refer to inclusion of **new business** and **new stakeholders**, as well as **new geographical focus** (e.g. port city relations, use of new land, relocation). Others report **limited changes**, as the (legal) requirements have not changed much.
- Most port authorities report **no legal obligations to consult stakeholders**, but most of them do involve stakeholders in the process of defining and developing their masterplans. These vary from **solely customers-focused**, to a more **wider stakeholder engagement** (port communities, companies, public authorities chamber of commerce, citizens groups, environmental and societal NGOs etc.). In some countries, **consultation and approval of local and/or regional authorities is obligatory**.
- Most ports consider having a masterplan as a **positive** rather than a burdensome exercise. Most ports underline that their masterplans are **supportive for further development** of the port, or as a **framework for discussion with stakeholders** (port community, local communities, government), but stress they need to contain some flexibility. Some ports do point towards the static nature of their plans, which **may be a barrier in the rapidly changing environment** - other ports underline the need to have a high-level document in this regard.

Next steps?



- Still (late) submissions are coming in....
 - GOOD: the more, the better!
- The secretariat will make a more detailed assessment.



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Innovation Fund: ongoing revision



- The European Commission has been in the process of **revising the Innovation Fund**, in light of the **recent revision of the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Directive**.
 - The Innovation Fund is the EU's funding programme to support innovative low-carbon technologies and processes in a number of key sectors, including the maritime sector.
 - Budget of €40 billion.
 - The fund uses revenues from the ETS to support the commercial demonstration of innovative low-carbon technologies.
- In light of the **inclusion of maritime emissions in the scope of the new EU ETS system**, the future Innovation Fund will provide for **dedicated maritime calls** in order to support the decarbonisation of the sector.
 - By 2030, 20 million allowances from the EU ETS should be deployed to support the decarbonisation of the maritime sector.
 - Ports were already eligible to apply for funding under the existing Innovation Fund
 - with projects incl in the areas of renewable energy, decarbonisation of energy-intensive industries, energy storage, and carbon capture, use and storage.
 - Yet the dedicated calls will be focused on the maritime sector, further opening up the door and making it easier for ports to apply for funding support for their innovative port projects.

Innovation Fund project portfolio

Green: Large-scale projects (23 awarded for grant)*

Blue: Small-scale projects (46 awarded for grant)*

- | | |
|---|---|
|  Biofuels and biorefineries |  Other energy storage |
|  Chemicals |  Geothermal energy |
|  CO ₂ transport and storage |  Pulp and paper |
|  Hydrogen |  Refineries |
|  Intra-day electricity storage |  Renewable heating/cooling |
|  Iron and steel |  Solar energy |
|  Non-ferrous metals |  Wind energy |
|  Glass, ceramics and construction material |  Cement and lime |
|  Manufacturing of components for renewable energy |  Use of renewable energy outside Annex 1 |
|  Manufacturing of components for energy storage |  Other energy intensive industries |



*The number of symbols is higher than the number of projects, as some projects are implemented in multiple locations

Innovation Fund Expert Group: ESPO priorities



As member of the Innovation Fund Expert Group, ESPO has been assisting DG CLIMA with the **revision of the Innovation Fund Dedicated Regulation**.

- One of the main ESPO priorities is to **make the case for on-shore power supply to get funding under the new Innovation Fund**.

DG MOVE has been saying that the Innovation Fund is not foreseen as the main instrument to finance OPS in ports, given that OPS is considered as a state of the art technology that is already considerably mature.

Yet:

- Current funding instrument AFIF does not adequately fit ports' needs.
- Clear priorities decided by the co-legislators in the revised ETS Directive:

*“The Commission shall [...] give special attention to projects contributing to the decarbonisation of the maritime sector and shall include topics dedicated to the decarbonisation of the maritime sector and shall include topics dedicated to that purpose in the Innovation Fund calls for proposals, where appropriate, including to **electrify** maritime transport, and to **address its full climate impact**, including black carbon emissions” (Article 10(a)(8)).*

The dedicated maritime calls for proposals “shall also, in the criteria used for the selection of projects, take particular account of the potential for biodiversity protection and for reducing noise and water pollution from projects and investments” (Article 10(a)(8)).

Core ESPO contribution:

- OPS installations do facilitate the **electrification of transport** and **do address multiple environmental aspects**, by reducing noise pollution in and around the port area, on top of reducing GHG and other environmental emissions such as air pollution.
- **A sole focus on breakthrough or highly disruptive projects would undermine the Innovation Fund’s potential to support those projects that are proven highly effective** in terms of emission reduction and must be improved and/or scaled up even further through further innovation.

Innovation Fund Delegated Regulation



Reflecting ESPO requests, the (draft) Innovation Fund Delegated Regulation now includes:

- **A reinforced focus on the broader climate benefits** in the emissions avoidance potential criterion (Article 11);
 - Particularly pointing to the maritime sector, the Commission has stated (in emails to IFEG members) that this reformulation should make it possible to assess projects' broader climate benefits beyond the reduction of GHG emissions.
- **A differentiated approach towards the degree of innovation criterion** according to the respective sector (Article 11);
 - The Commission has affirmed that the precise requirements on the degree of innovation will be specified in each call for proposals, allowing for an adaptation of the degree of innovation required according to the sectors or topics targeted.
 - ESPO's call to ensure the involvement of stakeholders and other external experts throughout the decision-making and implementation process, including when defining the specific award criteria for dedicated sector-specific calls, has not been adopted; the Commission restricts the involvement of external experts to evaluating project applications (Article 12).
- Revision regarding the rules on calculating the relevant costs to be supported by the Innovation Fund, in order to not only include investment costs (CAPEX) but also operating expenditure (OPEX) in its calculation (Article 5).
 - This is of paramount importance to the successful deployment and operation of technologies decarbonising the maritime sector.

Next steps?



- The Innovation Fund Delegated Regulation has been finalised and adopted by the Commission. (→ See [text](#) here)
 - Now the EP and CO have two months to oppose : in case of no objection, then adopted.
 - In terms of planning, the European Commission aims at launching the new calls (both for regular grants and for hydrogen auctions) on 23 November 2023.
 - In a recent meeting, the Commission informed that the dedicated maritime calls are expected to be launched (only) in 2025.
- **Secretariat will keep members up to date on new developments & upcoming open calls!**

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The background of the slide is a photograph of a port structure, likely a bridge or a large gantry, with a reddish-brown metal frame. The structure is set against a clear blue sky and a dark blue body of water. The text is overlaid on this image.

**THE INFRASTRUCTURE
INVESTMENT NEEDS
AND FINANCING
CHALLENGE OF
EUROPEAN PORTS**

UNDER REVISION

Update ESPO Port Investment Study: context




- Members recently decided to renew the ESPO Port Investment Study from 2018 (see 2018 version [here](#)).
Context:
 - The European Commission (DG MOVE) is starting the preparations for the next MFF and for the next Connecting Europe Facility (CEF III)
 - Aims for 100 billion EUR budget (4x current budget!!)
 - proposal to come out in 2025;
 - In parallel, **COM study of the investments needs** of TEN-T network; specific focus on port infrastructure needs for climate & geopolitical ‘resilience’;
 - Upcoming EU elections (June 2024)! ;
 - COM is proposing ESPO to come up with a detailed view on the investment needs of ports, both in terms of categories and budgets.
- The study will be lead by and developed together with **Dr. Peter de Lange**.
- It is expected that the investment needs of ports will have drastically changed since 2018 - in particular as a consequence of the Green Deal, the war in Ukraine, Brexit completed, Fit for 55, RePower EU, Net Zero Industry Act.....

Most relevant end results:

1) an updated overview of the investments pipeline

2018




2023:

- Similar total investment volume (of around €5 billion per year)?
- Changes in the types of investments?

Most relevant end results:

2) an updated overview of the investment drivers

2018




2023:

- More investments driven by energy transition and sustainable fuels?
- More investments driven by geopolitical events?
- Resilience? / More investments driven to be resilient (climate resilience, cybersecurity...)?

Most relevant end results:

3) does the value creation of the projects continue to justify public funding?

2018




2023:

- Higher relevance of investments to transition to zero carbon ports?
- More investments creating value through enhanced geopolitical resilience and/or climate resilience?

Most relevant end results:

4) More insights in the role and investments of port managing bodies in (sustainable) energy

2018



2023:

- More ports with investments?
- More investments in OPS?
- Expanded role for port authorities?
- Investments for energy as a new business?

Update ESPO Port Investment Study: foreseen timeline



Foreseen timeline:

- Develop and finalise survey questions by October 2023;
- Launch survey in November: sent to all EU ports;
- Deadline for replies in December/January?
- Final report March / at least before Connecting Europe Days in April (2-6 April 2024)

In order to enable comparison 2018-2023, limited modifications. Most important proposed modifications:

1. An additional question regarding energy related 'service provision'
2. An additional question to provide more detail regarding 'energy related investment projects'.
3. An additional question to provide more detail regarding 'investments to connect port to existing rail networks' (electrification, expansion,).
4. An additional / more focused question to provide more detail regarding investment projects strengthening climate/geopolitical resilience.

Draft survey: question 5



5. Please select the appropriate investment category for Project 1:

- I. Maritime access (dredging, sea locks, breakwaters)
- II. Expansion of port basins, quays, and terminal sites, including pavement of terminal sites
- III. Equipment and superstructure such as warehouses, terminal buildings, lighting, supply of utilities, terminal equipment (NB: investments cover both new equipment and retrofitting/upgrading of existing equipment)
- IV. Infrastructure for smooth transport flows within the port, including waterway, road, and rail network inside the port, rail terminals and parking lots
- V. Rail transport connection from port to main (TEN-T) line
- VI. Road transport connection from port to main (TEN-T) road
- VII. Inland waterway transport connection from port to main (TEN-T) inland waterway
- VIII. ICT/digital infrastructure for efficient and safe port & hinterland operations (e.g. fiber cables in port area, digital port community system services, and cybersecurity investments).
- IX. Intermodal/multimodal terminals in the port area and/or dry ports outside the port area
- X. Infrastructure and facilities for reducing the environment footprint of shipping, including facilities such as waste reception, ballast water treatment and infrastructure for green bunkering.
- XI. Investments in reducing the environmental footprint of port operations (e.g. cleansing of basins, nature in the port area, clean vessels operated by the port managing body).
- XII. Infrastructure and services related to the energy transition of the economy (e.g. energy generation, pipelines for new energy sources)
- XIII. Sites for port related logistics and manufacturing activities in the (proximity of the) port area
- XIV. Urban functions in port areas (leisure facilities like hotels, bars and restaurants, public space and office space, including port innovation facilities).
- XV. Other (please specify)

Draft survey: question 7



7 Does your investment contribute to the transition to a zero-emission economy and if so how? (various answers possible).

- Yes, the investment directly reduces the environmental footprint of the port managing body
- Yes, this investment directly contributes to sustainability of shipping and port operations (for instance by enabling electrification of terminal operations).
- Yes, this investment contributes to efficiency improvements in shipping and port operations (for instance by enabling scale increases or reducing ship congestion). These efficiency improvements have a positive environmental impact.
- Yes, this investment enables the efficient handling of zero emission commodities like offshore wind components and zero emission fuels (such as biofuels and green ammonia).
- Yes, the investment enables and creates conditions for attracting zero carbon industries (like circular economy activities, manufacturing/assembly of offshore wind components, or production of zero emission fuels (like hydrogen and biofuels) to the port.
- Yes, the investment contributes to shifting transport from road to (shortsea) shipping (modal shift).
- Yes, other:
- No, this specific investment does not contribute to the transition to a zero-emission economy.

Draft survey: question 10, 11



10 Does the investment enable your organization to offer new services?

Yes/no

11 Is the port managing body the main developer of the project?

Yes/No

11B If the port managing body is NOT the main developer of the project, who is:

- National government
- A state owned enterprise (including specific state entities, for instance those responsible for national pipeline infrastructure).
- Regional/local government.
- A private tenant/ company active in the port.
- Other

Draft survey: question 14, 15



14 Is the project commercially viable (i.e. is there a positive business case for the port managing body)?

Yes/no

15 If no, which mechanisms do you have secured / do you target to bridge the ‘funding gap’? (multiple answers can be given)

- EU grant (e.g. CEF)
- EU loan (e.g. EIB)
- National/regional grant
- National/regional loan
- Port managing body reserves/ funding from foreseen future available cash flows
- Other (please specify)

Draft survey: question 16



16 Please specify for whom the project creates value (multiple answer allowed):

- Value for current users of the port
- Value for future users of the port
- Value for society, through reduced environmental footprint (incl. protection of biodiversity)
- Value for residents in surroundings, through reduced negative effects (noise, stench, pollution)
- Value for citizens, through enabling the transfer of port land to urban functions
- Value for society, through enhancing the EU / national energy independence (energy security).
- Value for society, through enhancing the EU / national capacity to deal with extreme weather events (more climate-resilient infrastructure).
- Value for society, through enhancing the EU / national geopolitical resilience (e.g. military mobility, cybersecurity)
- Other (please specify)

Draft survey: question 17



17 Please select the most important drivers (maximum 3) of the investment:

- Expected growth of trade flows and resulting growth of volumes handled by ports
- Expected growth of cruise/ferry passenger volumes
- Increasing size of vessels (mega vessels as well as 'cascading effect' leading to larger vessels in other trades)
- Decarbonisation of the economy and the associated transition to zero carbon energy sources.
- Protection of the environment & ecological assets (e.g. biodiversity protection, nature restoration)
- Societal pressure and policies to shift hinterland cargo away from road transport (Transport policy)
- Increasing pressure to the use of port land close to city centres into pure urban functions
- Increased digitalisation of transport chains
- Increased attention for (EU/national) resilience in terms of adjusting international supply chains to geopolitical events, increasing the strategic autonomy of the EU and the ability to respond to extreme weather events (e.g. low or high water levels in inland waterways).
- Other (please specify)



18 Please indicate a maximum of three potential bottlenecks that threaten the successful realization of this investment project

- Complexity of achieving agreement amongst all project partners (including public authorities and users)
- Inability to secure funding for the investment project
- Lengthy and complex permitting procedures
- Legal hurdles stemming from environmental regulations (including nitrogen, PFAS, compensation, biodiversity).
- Increases in costs because of inflation and material costs
- Insufficient societal support for the investment project
- Other (please specify)

Next steps



- Draft survey questions to be shared (upcoming circular) with relevant committees to get their feedback, incl:
 - Port Governance and Management
 - Intermodal, Logistics & Industry
 - Energy Committee
 - Sustainable Development
- **Please provide feedback to the draft survey questions: are the questions clear and adequately formulated? Something essential is missing?**

Aim is to not extend the set of the questions - survey must remain doable!
- **DEADLINE for feedback (to the draft survey questions): end of October!**
(Filling out the survey at a later stage!)

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European Elections 2024



- European elections to take place from 6 – 9 June 2024.
- Will lead to a new European Commission and European Parliament.
- ESPO to start preparing.....!

ESPO initiative: relaunch joint CEF campaign!



More EU budget | The best Investment
for transport | Plan for Europe



ESPO initiative to relaunch the joint CEF-campaign “**More EU budget for transport**”.

- In light of upcoming elections, new Commission and Parliament & DG MOVE preparing the next CEF;
- Already more than 50 organisations have joined!
- On **18 September**, **kick-off meeting in ESPO office** with participation of Herald Ruijters (DG MOVE’s Acting Deputy Director-General);
- Campaign in the form of a **one-pager** with joint messages (as in 2019);
- Foreseen launch: in the run up to next year’s **Connecting Europe Days** (2-5 April 2024, Brussels);
 - Central theme : **strengthening Europe’s resilience** – understood in terms of both *climate resilience* and *strategic/geopolitical resilience*

Joint CEF Campaign: main themes



Main themes:

- Europe needs transport: transport as an enabler
- A resilient transport sector is a resilient Europe
- Transport as an essential key for EU competitiveness
- Decarbonisation of transport is the only way forward
- Transport creates employment
- Capacity is still lacking: invest in transport
- Grants essential to complete Europe's network
- A stronger Connecting Europe Facility

➤ **A few core sentences per theme**

➤ **Preparations are ongoing**

EU elections: ESPO priorities?



- After EU elections: new Commissioner and new Commission work programme, new Members of Parliament.
- As ESPO, what will be our main messages? What are our priorities for the new legislative term?

Exchange views

What should be ESPO priorities, incl in the field of port governance and management?



THANK YOU!

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